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Abstract
Background: Health insurance coverage for all citizens is often considered a requisite for reducing disparities in
health care accessibility. In Germany, health insurees are covered either by statutory health insurance (SHI) or
private health insurance (PHI). Due to a 20%–35% higher reimbursement of physicians for patients with PHI, it is
often claimed that patients with SHI are faced with longer waiting times when it comes to obtaining outpatient
appointments. There is little empirical evidence regarding outpatient waiting times for patients with different
health insurance status in Germany.
Methods: We called 189 specialist practices in the region of Cologne, Leverkusen, and Bonn. Practices were
selected from publicly available telephone directories (Yellow Pages 2006/2007) for the specified region. Data
were collected for all practices within each of five specialist fields. We requested an appointment for one of five
different elective treatments (allergy test plus pulmonary function test, pupil dilation, gastroscopy, hearing test,
MRT of the knee) by calling selected practices. The caller was randomly assigned the status of private or statutory
health insuree. The total period of data collection amounted to 4.5 weeks in April and May 2006.
Results: Between 41.7% and 100% of the practices called were included according to specialist field. We
excluded practices that did not offer the requested treatment, were closed for more than one week, did not
answer the call, did not offer fixed appointments ("open consultation hour") or did not accept any newly
registered patients. Waiting time difference between private and statutory policyholders was 17.6 working days
(SHI 26.0; PHI 8.4) for allergy test plus pulmonary function test; 17.0 (25.2; 8.2) for pupil dilation; 24.8 (36.7; 11.9)
for gastroscopy; 4.6 (6.8; 2.2) for hearing test and 9.5 (14.1; 4.6) for the MRT of the knee. In relative terms, the
difference in working days amounted to 3.08 (95%-KI: 1,88 bis 5,04) and proved significant.
Conclusion: Even with comprehensive health insurance coverage for almost 100% of the population, Germany
shows clear differences in access to care, with SHI patients waiting 3.08 times longer for an appointment than PHI
patients. Wide-spread anecdotal reports of shorter waiting times for PHI patients were empirically supported.
Discrepancies in access to care not only depend on accessibility to comprehensive health insurance cover, but
also on the level of reimbursement for the physician. Higher reimbursements for the provider when it comes to
comparable health problems and diagnostic treatments could lead to improved access to care. We conclude that
incentives for adjusting access to care according to the necessity of treatment should be implemented.
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Background
A large number of studies have investigated and provided
evidence of differential treatment of patients according to
ethnic membership, sex and geographical region [1-4].
There are, however, few studies which have focused on the
effects of insurance cover on the accessibility of health
care services and the allocation of appointments for elec-
tive treatments and in turn upon reduced waiting times
[5-7]. Studies in the US demonstrated longer waiting
times for appointments following a reduction of Medicare
reimbursement based on randomized telephone calls
with randomly assigned insurance types [8,9]. It was
shown that, in comparison to Medicare insurees, privately
insured or out-of pocket-payers were more likely to
receive an outpatient appointment within one week [10].
Within paediatric care, data from California have pointed
to differences in treatment according to insurance status
in the fields of surgery, urology, and orthopaedics [11-13].
There is evidence to suggest that physicians are responsive
to financial incentives [14,15]. Patients' insurance status
could be an indication of the level of financial reimburse-
ment for the physician. Anecdotal reports in Germany
generally conjecture that a patient's insurance status influ-
ences the allocation of appointments by registered physi-
cians in private practices. To date, there are no studies in
which physicians have been randomly contacted regard-
ing appointment requests.
This issue is of particular relevance. While insurance cov-
erage is available to almost all citizens in Germany, the
type of insurance status has an effect on the amount which
the physician is reimbursed. Approximately 10% of the
German population is covered by comprehensive private
health insurance. This form of insurance is not open to all
segments of the population, but is compulsory for civil
servants and optional for the self-employed and individu-
als with an annual income of more than 47.250 Euros
(60.000 US$; 32.500 GBP). It is not possible for other
population groups to take out a comprehensive private
insurance policy, though supplementary private insurance
packages remain an option. These additional policies cur-
rently only offer a modified range of services within in-
patient care, including treatment by the chief consultant
and allocation of a bed in a single room.
Given that private insurance premiums are based on mor-
bidity and age and statutory comprehensive health insur-
ance contributions on income, the extent to which
insurance from a private company leads to increased pol-
icyholder contributions or premiums in individual cases
can not be discerned. It is due to these premium guide-
lines that groups of individuals with lower morbidity and
higher income tend to be more greatly represented within
comprehensive private insurance.
A patient's status as private policyholder signifies a reve-
nue for the physician which is approximately 20–35%
higher than that which is to be gained in treating statutory
insurees. For this reason it has been conjectured that phy-
sicians are more inclined to offer private policyholders an
appointment and that ensuing treatment of these patients
is carried out more efficiently. Given that out-patient care
in Germany is almost entirely provided by private prac-
tices (and not by outpatient clinics/departments or hospi-
tal ambulatory care centres), potential consequences for
the general health care situation are immense.
The following study investigate whether private patients
are preferred over statutory health insurance policyhold-
ers in the allocation of appointments for elective outpa-
tient treatments.
Methods
An appointment was requested from those practices
included in the current study by means of a telephone call.
In Germany, requesting an appointment per telephone is
a standard procedure when it comes to making initial con-
tact regarding elective treatments. For each of the selected
specialist fields, appointment requests were made using
standardized conversation guidelines within a period of a
few days. The total period of data collection amounted to
4.5 weeks in April and May 2006. In a randomized man-
ner and with a probability of 50%, the caller claimed to be
either privately or statutorily insured. Each practice was
thus only called for one appointment. We assumed that
repeatedly calling using the same conversation script
could attract unnecessary attention. The caller did not
request an appointment in the near future and further did
not provide any exceptional reasons for the allocation of
an appointment at either an earlier or later date. In the
case that the particular health insurance company was
asked for, a market leading company in the respective
insurance sector was named. Upon inquiry of the name of
the referring physician, a fictitious physician from a dis-
tant region was named and a recent move to the present
area referred to.
Selection of physicians' practices
Practices were selected from publicly available telephone
directories (Yellow Pages 2006/2007) for the region
Cologne/Bonn/Leverkusen. Data were collected for all
practices listed under each specialist field in the directory.
Given that the number of practices in the region of
Cologne was below a threshold of 20, the selection was
expanded to include the neighbouring regions of
Leverkusen and Bonn. Criteria for the exclusion of prac-
tices were as follows: 1. Practice did not offer the treat-
ment in question. 2. Practice was currently closed for
more than one week of vacation. 3. Practice proved unat-
tainable after three attempted calls at various points inInternational Journal for Equity in Health 2008, 7:1 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/7/1/1
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time during the investigation (not including cases of "line
busy"). 4. Practice offered only an open consultation hour
and no fixed appointments. 5. Practice treated only pri-
vate patients or did not accept newly registered patients. 6.
Practice no longer existed. Each practice was randomly
called by either a supposedly private or supposedly statu-
tory health insuree. Insurance status was mentioned dur-
ing each phone call.
Selection of interventions and region
Interventions were selected according to the following cri-
teria: 1) Treatment should not be considered an emer-
gency, but rather an elective intervention. 2) Specialist
care, however, was indicated. 3) Condition is relatively
prevalent among the population. Interventions and spe-
cialist fields of the physicians are displayed in Table 1. In
Germany, all five selected interventions are generally per-
formed during a single elective appointment/visit and are
often handled on the basis of an outpatient referral from
a general practitioner to a specialist.
Requests for appointments for a colonoscopy (gastroen-
terology) and arthroscopy of the knee (orthopaedics)
were also initially planned. These were, however,
excluded on account of the emerging fact that colonos-
copy patients must first take part in informational courses
(colonoscopy as a preventative measure) and that arthro-
scopies are almost exclusively carried out in outpatient
hospitals.
The region Cologne, Leverkusen and Bonn is homogene-
ous with regard to population density and the subsequent
geographical distribution of physicians' practices and spe-
cialty practices. The region is typical of an urban West Ger-
man setting.
Statistical analyses
Both univariate analysis, referring to one specialist field at
a time, and multivariate analysis, in terms of a multivari-
ate regression model, were performed. For univariate
analysis the Wilcoxon rank sum test, also known as Mann-
Whitney test, was performed. Furthermore, the average of
days of waiting time (working days) and the correspond-
ing standard deviation were reported for each payment
source.
For multivariate analysis, the waiting time (response vari-
able) was modelled using a generalized linear model
(GLM) from the quasi-Poisson-family with the log link
function [16,17]. The number of working days between
phone call and appointment was employed as response
variable. Health insurance status (indicator variable) and
specialist field (factor variable) were introduced as regres-
sor variables. The interaction between specialist field and
insurance status was not included in the model equation,
as this effect did not reach significance (p = 0.40). The 5%
significance level was used for all statistical tests.
Table 1: Number of practices included in the study according to specialist field and intervention
Specialist field Intervention Data collection for all 
practices
Number of physicians' 
practices
Number of practices 
included
Allergology/Pulmonology Allergy test plus pulmonary 
function test
Yes (Cologne/Bonn/
Leverkusen)
SHI*:12 SHI: 5
41.7%
PHI**: 12 PHI: 5
41.7%
Ophthalmology Pupil dilation Yes (Cologne) SHI: 30 SHI: 22
73.3%
PHI: 31 PHI: 22
71%
Gastroenterology Gastroscopy Yes (Cologne/Bonn/
Leverkusen)
SHI: 6 SHI: 5
83.3%
PHI: 5 PHI: 5
100%
Oto-rhino-laryngology (ENT) Hearing test Yes (Cologne) SHI: 31 SHI: 22
71%
PHI: 31 PHI: 24
77.4%
Diagnostic Radiology MRT of the knee Yes (Cologne/Bonn/
Leverkusen)
SHI 16 SHI: 8
50%
PHI 15 PHI: 10
66.7%
MRT = Magnetic resonance tomography
* SHI = statutory health insurance
** PHI = private health insuranceInternational Journal for Equity in Health 2008, 7:1 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/7/1/1
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Results
A total of 189 practices were called; the inclusion rate var-
ied between 41.7% and 100% depending on specialist
field and health insurance status (Table 1). A total of 61 of
the 189 practices were excluded in line with the criteria
listed above. The number of practices excluded is dis-
played in Table 2 according to each of the six criteria. Most
practices were excluded because of the lack of offering the
service or treatment chosen for the specialty (34.4% of all
exclusions). Only limited relevance had the offering of
open consultation hours (16.4%) which might lead to a
first-come first-serve line with no preferential treatment of
PHI patients. However, anecdotal evidence indicates that
open consultation hours lead to an even more considera-
ble reduction in waiting times for PHI patients.
The number of included offices was highest in the special-
ist field ENT (46 included offices) and lowest in the spe-
cialist fields "Allergology/Pneumology" and
"Gastroenterology" (10 included offices each).
Waiting time differed significantly between public and
private insured in all but one specialist field (see Table 3).
The only exception was the specialist field "Allergology/
Pneumology" (p = 0.207). The relative difference was low-
est in the specialist field "Allergology/Pneumology",
where public insured had to wait 1.4 times as long and
highest in "Diagnostic Radiology", where public insured
had to wait 16.8 times longer than private insured. How-
ever, the relative differences in waiting time between the
specialist fields was not significant (p = 0.40). The overall
relative difference, as derived from the multivariate regres-
sion model, amounted 3.1 (95% confidence interval:
[1.9–5.0]).
The parameter estimates of the multivariate regression
model are presented in Table 4. No parameter estimates
are presented for the insurance status SHI and for the spe-
cialist field "Allergology/Pulmonology", because they
serve as reference.
Significance levels of the regressor variables "Health Insur-
ance Sstatus" and "Specialist Field" are presented in Table
5. Both variables had a significant effect on waiting time:
"Health Insurance Status" (p < 0.001) and "Specialist
Field" (p = 0.005).
The expected number of days to be waited leading up to
appointment date, according to the multivariate regres-
sion model, is presented in Table 6 for each of the inter-
ventions according to insurance status. The absolute
difference in waiting times between SHI and PHI patients
is highest in "Gastroscopy" (24.8 days; SHI: 36.7; PHI:
11.9) and lowest in "ENT" (4.6 days; SHI 6.8 days; PHI
2.2).
Discussion
Using a selection of elective out-patient examinations/
interventions in five specialist fields, we investigated the
extent to which insurance status influences the allocation
of next possible appointments. Earlier appointments were
offered to privately insured patients by physicians' prac-
tices in all specialist fields. In terms of relative differences,
publicly insured had to wait about three times longer than
privately insured.
Resneck et al. (2004), who conducted a similar study
based on randomly assigned insurance types, also found
a strong impact of reimbursement level on appointment
waiting times in the field of dermatology. [8] While the
length of waiting times was generally higher than in Ger-
many (30 to 50 days), the study revealed a potential influ-
ence of regional differences in market shares and level of
reimbursement. Furthermore, all previous studies using
telephone calls to request a hypothetical appointment
have shown that reimbursement levels have a strong
impact on waiting times [7-10,18]. Hu and Reuben
(2002) have, however, pointed out that the structure of
managed care in the health care market rather than reim-
bursement per se, could influence practice patterns in
terms of the time spent with the patient and hence access
to care [19].
Table 2: Reasons for exclusion of practices initially selected from the telephone directory
Reason for exclusion Total number of practices 
excluded n = 61)
Percent of excluded practices 
(61 = 100%))
Service/Treatment in question not offered, e.g. pulmonary function test 21 34.4
Practice closed for vacation for more than 1 week after the initial call (as 
indicated on the answering machine)
69 . 8
Practice not attainable after three attempts (excluding "line busy") 4 6.6
Practice offering only open consultation hours 10 16,4
Exclusive service for private insurees 13 21.3
Practice no longer in service 7 11.5International Journal for Equity in Health 2008, 7:1 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/7/1/1
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Table 3: Test statistics
Specialist field Public insurance Private insurance Test statistic W p value Ratio
Mean Std. N Mean Std. N
Allergology/Pneumology 19.8 6.3 5 14.6 6.2 5 6.0 0.207 1.4
Ophthalmology 24.9 32.7 22 8.5 13.9 22 128.5 0.008 2.9
Diagnostic Radiology 18.5 17.0 8 1.1 1.7 10 0.5 <0.001 16.8
Gastroenterology 40.4 28.7 5 8.2 6.1 5 1.0 0.020 4.9
ENT 6.0 6.7 22 2.9 5.3 24 168.0 0.031 2.1
Std. = standard deviation; N = number of subjects
Table 4: Parametric coefficients
Estimate Std. Error exp(Estimate) 95% CI t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 3.257 0.329 n.r. n.r. 9.908 <0,001***
Private insurance policyholder -1.124 0.251 0.32 [0.20, 0.53] -4.475 <0,001***
Specialist field Ophthalmology -0.032 0.359 0.97 [0.48, 1.96] -0.089 0.929
Specialist field Diagnostic Radiology -0.608 0.466 0.54 [0.22, 1.36] -1.305 0.194
Specialist field Gastroenterology 0.346 0.422 1.41 [0.62, 3.23] 0.819 0.414
Specialist field ENT -1.348 0.440 0.25 [0.11, 0.62] -3.064 0.003**
Response: Waiting time (days); link-funktion: logarithm; family: quasi-Poisson; model type: generalized linear model; n.r. = "not relevant")
Table 5: Significance of model terms
Df F p-value
Insurance status 1 20.029 <0,001
Specialist field 4 5.453 0.005
Response: Waiting time (days); link-funktion: logarithm; family: quasi-Poisson; model type: generalized linear model.
Table 6: Number of working days to be waited leading up to appointment date according to insurance status and specialist field/
intervention
Working days to be waited leading 
up to intervention
Intervention/Examination SHI PHI Difference in working days Difference expressed in 
% of PHI-waiting time
Allergy test and pulmonary function test 26.0 8.4 17.6 210%
Pupil dilation 25.2 8.2 17 207.3%
MRT of the knee 14.1 4.6 9.5 206.5%
Gastroscopy 36.7 11.9 24.8 208.4%
Hearing test 6.8 2.2 4.6 209%International Journal for Equity in Health 2008, 7:1 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/7/1/1
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Several limitations of our trial should be noted. Firstly, it
was performed in only one geographical region, without
testing whether these findings are also representative of
other areas. The region observed in this study features a
rather high percentage of private insurance policyholders
(as typical of cities). Whether this results in potentially
longer or shorter waiting times for those with private
insurance currently remains unclear. On the one hand, it
is possible that a higher percentage of privately insured
individuals may lead to less competition between prac-
tices in gaining private patients, which in turn could entail
longer waiting times for this group of patients. On the
other hand, a high percentage of PHI policyholders may
permit more practices which exclusively serve this sector,
so that waiting times for these patients is even shorter. As
can be seen in Table 2, 13 of the 189 practices selected
from the telephone directory were excluded due to the fact
that they only accepted private insurees; this is equal to
7% of the total practice sample. Since these practices were
excluded, it remains unclear whether waiting time differ-
ences between SHI and PHI insurees are even larger when
these practices are included. Nevertheless, our finding
clearly underscores that discrepancies in physicians' reim-
bursements are associated with disparities in access to
treatment.
Secondly, the selection of elective interventions in the
present study included only those which are not known to
be associated with inferior quality of medical results for
patients with later appointments. It is, however, largely
refuted that a relationship between quality of results and
waiting time does not exist. Prentice and Pizer (2007)
found evidence of an association between long waiting
times for outpatient health care and negative health out-
comes such as mortality for patients of Veterans Affairs
medical centres [20]. At the very least, the perceptions of
the patient, together with his/her uncertainty regarding
the expected treatment or examination results, appear to
result in a worsening of the subjective situation.
Conclusion
It is our view that the findings of the current study carry
considerable consequences for health policy. According to
these findings, the introduction of comprehensive health
insurance coverage is not adequate in establishing equal
access to medical treatment for all citizens. Rather, possi-
ble discrepancies in the level of reimbursement between
individual insurance status' have an immense influence
on access to health services in the case of identical ill-
nesses.
In Germany, a stringent distinction between private and
statutory health insurance prevails, which does not apply
to additional, but rather to comprehensive insurances.
Individuals with a higher income and lower morbidity
tend to have improved access to medical services through
comprehensive private insurance. It is in part argued that
unequal access is to be found in all health systems, in so
far as differences in income, willingness-to-pay and corre-
spondingly susceptible and amenable physicians exist.
This is no doubt true. However, private insurance in Ger-
many is clearly restricted to population groups with evi-
dent risk selection and financial favouritism. A lively
debate is currently underway in Germany concerning the
harmonization of reimbursement modi for SHI and PHI
patients. The alternative of introducing regulatory guide-
lines or even legal regulations for the safeguarding of
equal access to care for all insurees is not applicable to the
German situation. Firstly, it is obvious that a guideline
would never be successful in forcing physicians to rear-
range a waiting list, when strong financial incentives cause
them to prefer certain groups of patients. Soft factors that
are hard to control for, such as for example clinical condi-
tions, would always lead to advantages for those patient
groups that warrant higher reimbursement. Secondly,
unlike other countries, there are no combined reimburse-
ment schemes in Germany. Indeed, only two schemes
exist: one for SHI insurees and the other for PHI insurees.
The schemes mainly differ in the add-on factor found in
the reimbursement of treatment provided to PHI insurees.
Thirdly, both reimbursement schemes in Germany closely
resemble a legal guideline. The PHI-scheme has the status
of a government action, while the SHI-scheme is negoti-
ated between the Federal Association of Physicians and
health insurance companies. Harmonising reimburse-
ments for the treatment of SHI and PHI patients in Ger-
many is more a political than a legal issue.
In summary, our study demonstrates that reimbursement
models have an impact on patient access to treatment, a
fact often previously denied in Germany. From a health
policy perspective, it is to be concluded that insurance
coverage for the total population is not adequate in ensur-
ing equal access to medical services. Rather, insurance-
dependent reimbursement also influences the access pos-
sibilities of the patient. In aspiring for equality, an assim-
ilation of reimbursement models or the possibility of an
effortless change between insurance systems would be rec-
ommendable. Access to care should be adjusted according
to the necessity of treatment.
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